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The size of container ships has been gradually increasing for the last few decades, which is 
probably the most significant development of liner shipping and it should be analyzed from 
another perspective in light of recent events. This dissertation is a study of the economic 
viability of mega container ships under the new market condition. 
 
This paper will first analyze the evolution of container ships and the influencing factors for 
increasing ship size, which involves driving factors and limiting factors. Secondly, the 
paper established the calculation model for container ship cost and compared the unit cost 
of ships of different size. Then, the paper focused on the economic implication of sulfur 
cap on container ships, analysis and recommendations would be given to find the optimal 
solution for different ship size. 
 
The paper found that 23,000 TEU ship is still economically viable for Europe-Asian trade, 
incurring less daily unit cost than smaller ships. And shipping lines who operate mega 
ships are advised to stick to VLSFO during the pandemic to comply with sulfur cap, which 
is the most economical solution for now and near future. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Research Background  
Over the past few years, the world shipping industry had witnessed significant increase 
in containership size, most of which happened on Asia-Europe trade route. Major 
shipping lines are becoming much bigger through merger and acquisitions, giving them 
sufficient financial power to order bigger vessels with cutting-edge technology so as to 
exploit the economies of scale which were clearly defined and analyzed by maritime 
scholars.  
 
Back in 2011, the biggest containership in operation has the capacity of roughly 14,000 
TEU, which were owned by China Shipping. 9 years has passed, the biggest 
containership now is the M/V “MSC Gülsün” which can carry at most 2,3356 TEU. 
However, this record is not going to last long, because HMM is expected to deploy 12 
2,4000 TEU ships on Asia-Europe route in April in conjunction with the beginning of its 
membership in THE alliance. Apart from HMM and MSC, Hapag-Lloyd, CMA CGM, 
COSCO, Evergreen and ONE also have plans to build 2,3000+ TEU ships. However, 
Maersk, the largest shipping line, promised to refrain from ordering new ships in the 
next two years and its CEO questioned the cost advantage of these 2,3000 TEU ships 
under current market condition, because nowadays shipping line cannot fully load the 
ship to exploit economies of scale and only a few ports could accommodate these 
“giants”.  
 
Addition to these problems, shipping lines have to comply to the global Sulfur cap 
coming into effect this year. Various options are chosen by different companies, each 
indicates different reasoning and benefit. Thus, it is quite important to analyze the 
economic viability of 2,3000+ TEU ship under current market condition which contains 




1.2   Research Purpose 
The main purpose of this dissertation is to establish a model to analyze the economic 
viability of mega containerships and the influencing factors for it, base on which the 
suggestions would be given so as to facilitate the liner company decision-making. This 
study could also improve the operational excellence, cost saving as well as the 
regulation compliance of the shipping lines. 
1. To identify the economic benefits or disadvantages of mega containerships 
2. To provide guidance for containership cost analysis and saving 
3. To identify the influencing factors of the mega containership economic viability 
4. To comply with global Sulfur cap in an economical way 
 
1.3   Research Methodology 
The methods adopted by this paper include qualitative analysis and quantitative analysis. 
The former refers to the analysis of the influencing factors for ever increasing container 
ship sizes while the latter is about constructing Microsoft Excel model for calculating the 
cost of mega-ships under new conditions. Data used for these analyses will be collected 
from primary sources (such as UN, IMO, shipping lines and manufacturers) and secondary 








Chapter 2 Literature Review 
2.1 The Economies of Scale of Liner Shipping 
There are plenty of researches on the economic viability of mega containerships by 
Scholars and shipping lines. This paper adopts the definition gave by International 
Transport Forum who deems ships with a capacity of at least 18,000TEUs as mega-ships 
(Merk, 2018). 
 
Wang Xuefeng (2006) assessed the economies of scale existing in the container shipping 
sector by setting minimizing shipping cost and inventory cost as two separate objective 
and constructing a two-objective model. Li Jing (2005) discussed the economies of scale 
from two perspectives, i.e. container ship and liner shipping company. He argued that 
economy of scale is the basic motive for increasing the size of container ships. Shipping 
alliance and M&A in the market represents the exploitation of economies of scale on the 
company level. Guo Yonghong (2000) examined the economies of scale of container 
shipping by constructing mathematical model for container transport cost. Yan Jiaming 
(2012) found that mega-ships tend to be more profitable than smaller ones and can better 
exploit the economies of scale when the economy is growing rapidly. William Murray 
(2016) analyzed the cost structure of container ship and found that as vessel capacity 
increases, the construction cost per TEU clearly decreases. It is also pointed out that 
marginal decrease in cost savings as ship size increases.  
 
Kevin Cullinane and Mahim Khanna (2000) constructed mathematical model to quantify 
the economies of scale in large container vessels, found that the voyage time and the 
voyage are the two causal factors which have the most significant effect on costs. The 
paper argued that deploying mega-ship can only offer short term advantage, because it 
does not take long for its competitors to following this strategy. Additionally, the 
research on the economic viability of mega container ships was done by adopting a non-




configurations for different ship sizes, which concluded that mega-ships are competitive 
in all scenarios on Asia-Europe trade routes while it is only profitable in Asia-North 
America market provided the freight rates and feeder cost are low（Akio Imai et al., 
2006）. Chen Feier (2008) analyzed the economic viability of mega containerships in 
different service networks by building the ship cost model and routing model. She 
concluded that mega-ships remain competitive in Asia-Europe trade, but it can only be 
economically viable in Asia-North America trade provided the feeder costs are low. 
 
2.2 The Influencing Factors and Implications of Mega Ships 
Weng Yubo (2018) examined the main influencing factors of economic value for 
megaships, which are cargo volume, fleet capacity, vessel price, freight rate, OPEX and 
financing method. He also found that Megaship’s profitability is more sensitive to changes 
of freight rates, fuel price, loading rate, port charges and interest rate, comparing with 
smaller ships. Wu Honggao (2012) found there are many technical aspects which limit the 
growth of container ship sizes. Mega-ships have low maneuverability, with longer time for 
turning circles and stopping distance, which means it is more difficult to operate than 
smaller ones. This increase the job difficulty and pressure for crew who are required to be 
extra cautious when navigating in restricted waters, for mega-ships are more likely to have 
accident.  
 
Rodrigue (2020) studied the evolution of the container ship which were divided into 
several stages and Olaf Merk (2018) examined the pressure that mega-ships brought to the 
port facilities and infrastructure. Mega-ships have also generated industry consolidation 
and more intense co-operation via alliance which lead to a concentration of regional port 
systems. The study also argued that increase of ship size on one trade route has cascading 
effects across all trade routes, squeezing out the smaller ships. Rahul Kapoor (2016) 
argued that the cost savings achieved by deploying bigger ships might be partially offset 
by the additional cost incurred by port and terminals. Though Shipping lines obtained sea 




generated higher costs in other parts of the supply chain. The scale economy from mega-
ships only work for the total supply chain of terminals can increase productivity in line 
with increase in ship size. Jost Bergmann (2014) examined the limitations of ship capacity 
growth, which are imposed by port facilities and infrastructures, such as quay length, crane 
outreach as well as turing basin diameter. Sherif Helmy and Ahmed Shrabia (2016) studied 
the pros, cons and the implications of mega container ships. Mega vessels help to bring 
down the coast of container shipping but also raising concerns among vessel operators, 
insurers. They predicted that further increase in ship size could result in negative impacts 
and even crisis.  
 
Jong Sil Baik (2017) found that mega-ships require adaptations of port infrastructure, 
container handling equipment and create larger peaks in container traffic in ports, with 
wide ranging impacts. Martin Stopford (2002) pointed out that tanker size reached its peak 
in 1970s and then went down due to change of commercial environment, this process could 
be repeated by container ships. He argued that shipper could not enjoy the savings 
achieved by bigger ships if there are diseconomies in other parts of the whole transport 
system. International Transport Forum (2015) recognized the cascading effect that would 
take place after ship upsizes and herd effect which tends to result in oversupply of ships in 
the market. The report found that a significant proportion of the cost reduction were 
achieved by ship upsizing up to 5,000 TEU, beyond which the reduction becomes much 
smaller.  
 
Nam Kyu Park and Sang Cheol Suh (2019) examined the size of port facilities which are 
able to accommodate mega container ships, and found that larger ships wait for longer in 
port than smaller ships due to port restrictions. Guan Changqian, Ahalom Shmuel and Yu 
Jun (2017) used multiple regression model to analyze the relationship between ship size 
and port time, and found that one per cent growth in vessel size would raise port time by 
2.9 per cent. McKinsey (2018) predicted that 50,000 TEU ship will be put into operation in 
2066 and created two scenarios in 2066 for container trade. The study also provided 




and Jin (2014) studied the driving factors and limiting factors for the development of mega 
container ships, and predicted that container ship size will continue to growth after some 
technological breakthrough. 
 
2.3 The Analysis of Global Sulfur Cap 
The global sulfur cap coming into effect this year changed liner shipping market 
significantly, the economic implications for which have to be examined if we want to value 
the economic viability of mega containerships under current market conditions. Simme 
Veldman, Cees Glansdrop and Robert Kok (2011) included the ship design parameters and 
exhaust emissions into the model for calculating ship cost, and concluded that economies 
of scale continue to exist for ships up to 25,000 TEU. Qian Qiang and Liu Jia (2016) 
estimated the additional cost caused by scrubber and its payback period and discuss 
whether it is economically competitive to install the scrubber on chemical tankers. Zhang 
Tongxu (2019) studied the countermeasures for shipping companies and examined the cost 
of each of them, based on which recommendations was given for relevant parties. 
 
Though there plenty of researches and studies on mega containership, revisions and 
adjustments need to be made based on market changes which could nullify the previous 
conclusions. 
 
1. Global Sulfur cap is expected to incur significant cost on shipping lines, which is 
impossible for previous studies to foresee. The cost for complying with this new 
regulation needs to be taken into consideration when analyzing the economic viability 
of mega containerships. Thus, the paper will incorporate the cost analysis of sulfur cap 





2. The optimal ship size has been calculated repeatedly for the past decades, most of the 
results were already proved wrong. Several papers concluded that the ideal ship size or 
the biggest size for profitable containerships is around 20,000 TEUs or even lower. 
However, the current market has seen ships much bigger than that and could 
reasonably expect that even bigger ship will be built soon. And some in the industry 
are questioning the economic viability of the latest type of mega container ships. 
Consequently, the theory of scale economy in the shipping sector and the analysis for 





Chapter 3. The Influencing Factors for Increasing Ship Size 
3.1 The Evolution of Container Ships 
The evolution of containerships is divided into several stages to better reflect its features 
and characteristics developed with new technologies and commercial environment. 
 
Containerization started in 1950s, leading to large scale deployment of container ships, the 
first generation of which were either converted from bulkers or tankers. The famous “idea-
X” was a converted tanker made during the second world war, many shipowners followed 
this strategy, because the massive production of vessels carrying supplies for allies during 
the war created overcapacity in bulk transport market, and the conversion was less costly 
than building containerships which were totally unfamiliar for the shipowners then. These 
“forerunner” in container shipping industry could carry around 700 TEU of containers and 
was equipped with cranes, for many terminals at that time did not have the capacity and 
facility for handling containers. Malcolm Mclean, the father of containerization, realized 
that containership’s economic potential can only be fully utilized if the port could find a 
way to handle containers efficiently. He himself invested much in finding the most cost-
effective way for loading and discharging containers. As the terminal operators invested 
increasing amount of money in container handling facilities, the first full cellular 
containership was introduced in 1968, which was more specialized, efficient and also 
faster than those converted tankers, could carry 1,100 TEU and shipboard cranes have to 
give way to more carrying capacity to better utilized the ship’s economic benefit. Several 
years later, major container shipping routes became operative, such as trans-pacific routes, 
trans-Atlantic routes, Asian-Europe route, Asia-Oceania route and Asian-Africa route.     
 
Container ship, like other ship types, were getting bigger after its invention. As the initiator 
of containerization, United States was the home to many liner companies of great renown, 
who were operating in the west coast and east coast of America. Thus, Panama Canal 




passing. Due to the physical limit of the canal, container ships size also reached a limit, 
whose draft, beam were limited by the depth of water and width of the canal. 
Consequently, the ship that reached the size limit of Panama Canal was defined as 
Panamax, with a capacity of roughly 4,000 TEU.     
 
In late 1980s and 1990s, with the development of international commodity trade, the 
capacity of Panamax could no longer satisfy the increasing demand. Post-Panamax (4,000-
8,000 TEU) was subsequently introduced, these ships could not go through the Panama 
Canal until the canal expansion project which was finished in 2016. The formation of 
shipping alliance in 1995 further facilitated the deployment of bigger ships. In 2005, ships 
with the capacity of at least 8,000 TEU became the major ship type for deep sea trade. 
Based on the new canal parameters, Neo-Panamax was designed and built, with the 
capacity of 13,000 TEU. These ships imposed new pressure for the terminal operators who 
had to upgrade its facilities every time the container ship upsized. 
 
 
Figure 1. Development of container ship size. From “The Impact of Mega-Ships, 2015”, by International 





As Figure 1 shows, the growth of container ship size has accelerated since 2000, doubling 
its size within just a few years. The Very Large Containership (VLCS), which can carry 
around 14,000 TEU, was deployed. 6 years from that, a 18,000 TEU ships was deployed 
and was defined as Ultra Large Containership (ULCS), based on which the containerships 
were still getting bigger. In order to adapt to this change, Suez Canal was also expanded in 
2016. After 2017, increasing number of container ships carrying more than 20,000 TEU 
were deployed, indicating a further expansion of containership size. However, naval 
architects are still considering bigger containerships, for example, the Malacca Max, which 
theoretically could carry 30,000 TEU (Rodrigue, 2020). 
 
3.2 The Driving Factors 
Many factors contributed to the investment of bigger container ships, this paper will focus 
on the most important of which, i.e., international commodity trade growth, market 
consolidation, scale economies. It needs to be stressed that the following factors are to 
some extent interrelated, for instance, the scale economies of liner shipping give rise to the 
formation of shipping alliance, M&A and building of megaships (Li, 2005). 
 
3.2.1 World Commodity Trade Growth 
Trade can affect the growth of vessel size, for example, size of crude oil carrier had 
increased to 440,000 dwt until 1970s when the trade changed and oil traders who 
controlled the transport became more interested in flexibility than size, thus the size of 
tanker decreased (Stopford, 2002). 
 
Growth of global commodity trade facilitates the development of mega containerships. 




former will grow as the latter grows. Since the beginning of containerization in 1950s, the 
world has witnessed the wide spread of the idea of free trade which gradually got adopted 
as policies in many countries, tariff barrier was reduced worldwide as a result. In addition, 
the collapse of the Soviet Union and socialist countries in eastern Europe enabled new 
players to join the global economic and trade system. The rise of Asian economies (such as 
Japan, South Korea, Taiwan) and the reform and opening up of China had created huge 
demand of raw materials and unprecedented amount of export of manufactures to all parts 
of the world. It needs to be stressed that the development of container shipping technology 
which could partly displayed by increasingly bigger ships also have a positive effect for 
trade growth.   
 
 
Figure 2. World seaborne trade volume (loaded and unloaded). Compiled from the database of United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). 
 
3.2.2 The Shipping Market Consolidation  
The liner shipping market has been consolidated through merger & acquisition over the 
past few decades, especially the decade after the financial crisis. According to Alphaliner, 
top 10 liner companies in 2008 accounted for 26.6% of global container fleet capacity, this 
figure rose to 83% in 2020, further demonstrating the level of consolidation in liner 






















































































































deliveries increased the intensity of competition. Liner service is highly standardized and 
shipping line found it extremely hard to differentiate their service, thus lowering freight 
rate somehow became the one of the few options to remain competitive in the market, 
which put downward pressure on earnings. Another option is merger & acquisition which 
lead to further horizontal integration, for liner companies could enhance market control 
and competitiveness through resource integration and resource optimization. Generally 
speaking, bigger company has more recourses which put them in a better financial position 
to invest in mega-ships (Helmy & Shrabia, 2016).  
 
The formation of shipping alliances also contributed to the consolidation of the market. 
Shipping alliance is a flexible form of co-operation, enable shipping lines to further benefit 
from economies of scale through employment of mega ships (Imai et al., 2006). Currently, 
there are three alliances in the industry: 2M alliance (Maersk, Mediterranean Shipping 
Company), Ocean alliance (COSCO shipping company, CMA CGM, Evergreen) and THE 
alliance (ONE, Hyundai, Hapag-Lloyd, YangMing), all of which provide the 81.3% of the 
liner shipping capacity. Number of shipping alliances has halved since 2001. Alliance 
members could gain better access to shippers through slot sharing agreement, which could 
help them attract more cargo and increase vessel utilization, leading to the investment of 
bigger ships. 
 
3.2.3 The Scale Economy 
The economy of scale existed in the shopping industry is arguably the most important 
driving factor for the development of mega containerships. the shipping scale economy 
means that average vessel fixed cost, unit shipbuilding cost and unit operating cost would 
reduce as ship size increases (Wang, 2006). The deployment of bigger ships enables 
shipping lines to save more unit cost which put them in a better position in the short term 
than their competitors who do not possess vessels of equivalent size. Thus, when one 
company decides to increase ship size, its competitors may follow suit (Cullinane & 





3.2.4 Technological Improvement 
The technological advancement facilitates the development of megaships which were 
theoretically impossible in the last century. Many technological problems had to be 
overcome, for example, the construction of mega container ships requires thicker steel 
plates, making it extra difficult for wielding operation and it may lead to technological 
problem which endangers the safety of the ship at sea during bad weather. This was solved 
by the development of new materials which are resistant to corrosion, low temperature 
(Xiang et al., 2014). It is also reasonable to expect that the "fourth industrial revolution", 
which will create new materials technology, could create further upsize the mega container 
ship. However, the time for the fourth industrial revolution is hard to predict. 
 
3.3 The Limiting Factors 
Many limiting factors slowed down or limited the growth of containership size by making 
the deployment of bigger vessel less economical, some of which have troubled the industry 
since the beginning of containerization. 
 
3.3.1 Port Constraints 
The economic value of container ships cannot be utilized if the destination port does not 
have the capability to accommodate the ship. The physical constraints of ports are related 
to draft, beam, length and so on. Bigger ships have low maneuverability, with longer time 
for turning circles and stopping distance, and quay length could seriously restrict the 
movement of such ship (Wu, 2012). Ship beam is also a concern, which has to be 
compatible with the crane outreach and seaways in order for it to be properly served. Draft 
also must be considered, “the depth of sea channel should be adequate to safely 




world are using dredging facilities to deepen their draft, so the ULCVs whose draft 
normally is 14.5 m-16 m could avoid running aground (Bergmann, 2014).  
 
Port operational constraints need to be taken into consideration, the first of which is 
handling capacity. Mega container ships can create huge cargo flow for destination port, so 
ports are required to handle it efficiently, otherwise ship would spend too much time in 
port which creates significant diseconomies, because ships are only generating profits 
during sea voyage rather than staying in port. In another word, economies of scale that are 
gained at sea are lost at the port (Guan et al., 2017), for larger the ship, longer the time 
spent in port. Other port facilities, such as container yard and warehouses, together with IT 
system and inland transport are also relevant to the port operational excellence. If the local 
infrastructure could not transport the cargo discharged from ship to the hinterland, the 
scale economies of mega ships still could not be fully utilized. Thus, the development of 
mega ships has to be compatible with port’s development, which will lead to the building 
of bigger port and terminals, bigger cranes, higher terminal productivity. This could result 
in longer handling peak time and bigger peak volume (Jong, 2017).    
 
3.3.2 Vessel Utilization Rate 
One of the assumptions for the calculation of the scale economies in liner shipping is that 
the vessel’s carrying capacity is highly utilized (around 80%-90%). However, this 
assumption is hard to be met, especially during low seasons. The delivery of large number 
of mega ships worsen the problem of overcapacity, making it even harder to fully load the 
ship. The unbalanced trade also affects vessel’s utilization, for instance, analysis of 
commodity flow for Europe-far east trade and fleet capacity, shows overdemand for 
westbound trade and oversupply of capacity for eastbound trade (Weng, 2018), same thing 
happens to trans-pacific trade. However, “trade flows will become more balanced across 
trade lanes as incomes converge between East Asia and developed economies, and the 





The cost advantages of container ships diminishing as utilization reduced (Kapoor, 2016), 
consequently, unutilized capacity ultimately leads to lower profitability, even making 
bigger vessel lesser economic than smaller ones. When the utilization rate is lower than 
79%, a panama is more economic than a 6,000 TEU ship (Guo, 2000). “Weak trade growth 
and the sustained delivery of mega container ships in an overly supplied market exerted 
further pressure on fundamental market balance, resulting in lower freight rates in general” 
(UNCTAD, 2019, p.41). Consequently, the weaken market and possibly low return of 
mega ships might discourage shipping lines from ordering such ships. 
 
3.3.3 Vessel’s Flexibility 
The increasing size of container ship limits its choice of shipping routes, for instance, 
mega ships are often deployed on the Europe-Asian route and call at several hub ports, the 
long distance and large cargo volume of this route justifies such arrangement. Since only a 
few hub ports could accommodate these mega container ships, feeder service is of vital 
importance, which of cause incur extra cost. Chen (2008) found that the competitiveness of 
mega ships declines as the feeder cost rises. Consequently, as container ships further 
upsizes which outpaces the upgrade of port facilities, the demand for feeder service would 
increase, possibly leading to uneconomical operation of mega ships.  
 
In addition, the deployment of bigger ship has cascading effect (International Transport 
Forum & OECD, 2015). The newly built ship with bigger capacity would replace smaller 
ships on certain trade routes, and those ships which were being replaced will substitute 
vessels with even smaller capacity on other routes. Ultimately, the average capacity of 
vessels on all trade routes would rise. Under this scenario, many mega ships will be 
transferred (cascaded) to other trade routes which could not compare with Europe-Asia 
route in terms of distance and cargo volume, so these ships would suffer from reduced ton-




trade. Consequently, mega ships have low flexibility and can only rely on a few routes at 
current stage, which limits the growth of container ship size. 
 
3.3.4 Weakened Global Economy 
When the ship is getting bigger, its utilization rate, and subsequently profitability, are 
becoming more sensitive to economic fluctuation (Yan, 2012). In 2019, under the impact 
of protectionism and unilateralism, the world economic growth continued to decline. 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) estimated that the 
world GDP growth in 2019 declined to roughly 2.3% from 3% of previous year, which 
indicates a further drop comparing with 3.1% growth in 2017. The world economic growth 
from 1994 to 2008 averaged at 3.3%, higher than the figure of last 3 years. China’s growth 
has been slowing down continuously over the past few years, dropped to only 6.1% in 
2019 which is partly contributed to the trade tension. However, China is still among the 
world's leading economies, contributing 28% to world economic growth in 2019, making it 
the largest contributor to world economic growth for 14 consecutive years. 
 
The outbreak of coronavirus also seriously damaged the global economy. China was hit by 
the virus first, forcing it to lockdown the city of Wuhan, the strategic transport center of 
China. It is estimated that the Chinese GDP growth in 2020 would drop below 6% because 
of the virus. According to World Health Organization, up to March 12th, the virus has 
spread to 114 countries in the world, 118,000 people was infected. Italy was the second 
country to lockdown cities and many countries were also limiting international flights as 
well as other forms of transport. The world economy is hurting by the virus, which would 






Chapter 4 The Economic Analysis of Mega Container Ships 
4.1 The Assumption 
In order to build a calculation model, several assumptions must be made. Firstly, the vessel 
in question can attract enough cargo, which means the vessel could achieve 90% utility for 
westbound service and 50% for eastbound service. Secondly, only fuel cost, port dues and 
cargo handling cost will be included for voyage cost analysis. Thirdly, the vessel will be 
financed 100% by bank loan, loan period is 5 years and the installment will be paid 
quarterly. Fourthly, the vessel in question would be operational for 350 days per year. 
Fifthly, annual operating cost equals to 3.5% of vessel newbuilding price. 
 
4.2 The Capital Cost 
The cost of capital is the cost for buying the ship, which is composed of depreciation and 
interest of loan. 
 
Shipping lines tend to apply for loan from banks in order to finance the investment of new 
vessels and pay interest, because ordering new ship is extremely expensive that it is not 
economical or feasible for shipping lines to pay for it with their own capital. Tax is indeed 
a part of the capital cost, which can be reasonably reduced or even avoided, consequently, 
it will not be included in our discussion for simplicity. The daily capital cost can be 
formulated as follows, 
 






CC - Capital Cost 
OL - Outstanding Loan 
IR- LIBOR 
MG - Margin 
P - Principal 
L - Loan Period 
OD - Operating Days 
 
4.3 The Operating Cost 
Operating costs refer to the maintenance expenses needed to keep the ship seaworthy. 
Shipping lines need to hire crew to operate the ship, which incurs costs. In this paper, Crew 
wages is a general term, referring to crew wages, navigation allowance, food allowance 
and bonus, etc.  
 
Maritime industry is known to be a very risky industry, many risks have to be taken into 
account when operating ships. Great fluctuation of freight rate creates significant 
commercial risk, but risk related to sea voyage can be more significant. For instances, ship 
might collide with other ships and may hit the rock during voyage. Shipping lines need to 
protect themselves from those risks and potential financial loss cause by it, consequently, 





Repair & maintenance of ships are required by classification society, insurance company 
and other parties for save voyage, which has to be done periodically. These activities incur 
additional costs for shipping lines, which is classified as operational cost.   
 
Stores cost refers to the cost of materials used and consumed by the ship, such as 
equipment, spare parts, accessories, the most important of which is lubricant for main 
engine as well as auxiliary engine. As vessel getting older, cost of stores tends to increase, 
for example, the amount of spare parts required is expected to rise. 
 
Administration cost refers to the shore-based staff wages, office rent, and administrative 
expenses incurred by the management personnel of the shipping company, which shall be 
calculated as part of operating costof vessels. Unlike tramp shipping where several staffs 
could operate a vessel, liner shipping requires huge amount of shore-based staff to support 
daily operation of even a few ships. Because every container ship is dealing with thousands 
of shippers who have numerous containers to ship per voyage, while tramp shipping 
normally only carries the cargo of only one shipper. This feature of liner shipping makes 
administration cost quite important. 
 
The operating cost of the vessel tends to be kept secret by shipping lines as important 
commercial intelligence, so the actual data for which is hard to come by. However, it is 
reasonable to estimate that the annual sum of R & M, insurance, administration and store 
cost equals to 3.5% of the price of the ship, which is quite close to the actual data (Guo, 
2000). With the rapid development of vessel technology, container ships need lesser crew 
nowadays, for instance, a 13,500 TEU vessel owned by Maersk only has 13 seafarers. 
Thus, crew cost will account for a small proportion of total operating cost in the future, 
which can be negligible (Wang, 2006). In this paper, we would assume that total annual 






OC = (3.5 %  VV) / OD        （4-2） 
 
Where; 
OC - Daily Operating Cost 
VV - Vessel Value 
OD - Operating Days 
 
4.4. The voyage cost  
Voyage cost refers to the expenses incurred by the voyage of the ship.  
 
Fuel cost, the most important part of voyage cost, refers to the sum of all fuel expenses 
consumed by a ship during its navigation, berthing and loading and unloading operations. 
The fluctuation of fuel price often heavily influences the profitability of the entire shipping 
line, reflecting how important fuel cost is. Port and canal charges is the sum of all expenses 
incurred in the port of call for its facilities and service provided, such as tonnage dues, 
berthing fees, dock fees, tug fees, mooring and unmooring fees, etc. The port dues of 
different port of call can vary significantly, which has to be taken into consideration of 
ship’s economic analysis. Cargo handling charges refer to the sum of all expenses incurred 
in the operation related to cargo handling. Canal charges is the expense incurred when 
passing through the Panama Canal or Suez Canal which is quite complicated to calculate. 






VC = FC + PD + CHC        （4-3） 
 
Where; 
VC - Daily Voyage Cost 
FC - Daily Fuel Cost 
PD - Daily Port Due 
CHC -Daily Cargo Handling Cost 
 
And for container ships, the daily fuel cost can be formulated as follows, 
 
FC = OC  FP        （4-4） 
 
Where, 
OC - Daily Fuel Oil Consumption 
FP - Fuel Oil Price 
 




assume that vessel’s capacity and speed is related to its daily fuel consumption, and the 
formula for which can be formulated as follows, 
 
OC =  + CA  X1 + S  X2        （4-5） 
 
Where, 
OC - Daily Fuel Oil Consumption 
 - Intercept 
CA - Vessel Capacity 
S - Vessel Speed 
X1 - X Variable 1  
X2 - X Variable 2 
 
Multiple liner regression would be used to calculate those variables and intercept. 106 sets 
of data were obtained from the database of Clarkson Research, which contains the design 
capacity, the service speed and the daily fuel consumption (VLSFO) of the vessel. 106 sets 
of data were imported into EXCEL before OC calculation formula was established in it, 
after that the value of intercept and X variables was given.  
 
The results of multiple liner regression analysis are shown in Table 1, the value of β is -




also tell from Table 1 that prob is extremely close to 0, which is less than 5%, meaning that 
those values are acceptable. 
 
Table 1 
The results of multiple liner regression analysis in EXCEL 
 
 
Therefore, the daily fuel consumption can be formulated as follows, 
 
OC = -150.946 + 0.004097  CA + 13.44745  S        （4-6） 
 









df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 2 651864.5 325932.3 318.5964 7.76E-45
Residul 103 105371.6 1023.026
Total 105 757236.2
CoefficientsS andard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95%Upper 95%Lower 95.0%Upper 95.0%
Intercept -150.946 12.6287 -11.9526 0.00 -175.992 -125.9 -175.992 -125.9
X Variable 10.004097 0.000708 5.787014 0.00 0.002693 0.005501 0.002693 0.005501





PD =  PDP / VT        （4-7） 
 
Where, 
PDP - Port Due of Every Port of Call 
VT - Voyage Time  
 
And for container ships, the daily container handling cost can be formulated as follows, 
 
CHC =  CP / VT        （4-8） 
 
Where,  
CP - Container Handling Cost of Every Port of Call 
VT - Voyage Time 
 





TC = (CC + OC + VC) / CA        （4-9） 
Where, 
TC - Total Daily Cost 
CC - Daily Capital Cost 
OC - Daily Operating Cost 
VC - Daily Voyage Cost 
CA - Ship Capacity 
 
4.5 Comparison of Cost between Different Ship Sizes at Fixed Route 
 
Comparison is better made when some factors are fixed. In this research, we choose AEU3 
of COSCO shipping lines as the fixed route. The vessel would start the voyage in the port 
of Tianjin, then sail to Dalian, to Shanghai, Ningbo, Singapore, Piraeus, Rotterdam, 
Hamburg and Antwerp, then sail back to Rotterdam, Shanghai and finally Tianjin. 
 
3 vessels are selected for this cost analysis, the first of which is CSCL STAR, a Container 
Ship built in 2011 and currently sailing under the flag of Hong Kong, with a capacity of 
14,000 TEU. This vessel is owned by COSCO shipping lines, currently operating on the 
route of AEU3. The second vessel is COSCO Shipping Sagittarius, a Container Ship built 
in 2018 and currently sailing under the flag of Hong Kong, which is can carry up to 20,119 
TEU, also operating on the route of AEU3. The third vessel was ordered by COSCO in 




be deployed on the route of AEU3 for the benefit of our research. 
 
Table 2 
Basic Parameters for Capital Cost Analysis of Container Ships  
Vessel Capacity 14,000 TEU 20,000 TEU 23,000 TEU 
Newbuilding 
Price 
$116,800,000 $139,500,000 $ 155,700,000 
LIBOR 2% 2% 2% 
Margin 2% 2% 2% 
Loan Percent 100% 100% 100% 
Loan Period 5 years 5 years 5 years 
Interest Period 3 months 3 months 3 months 
Note: Own elaborations based on industry data and estimates. 
 
As Table 2 shows, all 3 vessels will be 100% financed from bank who offers a margin of 
2% on top of the 2% of LIBOR. The principal and interest will be paid quarterly within 5 
years. Additionally, these vessel prices are quoted based on current market conditions, 
because the CSCL STAR was built in 2011, which actually costed more than building a 
23,000 TEU vessel in 2019, and thus the economies of scale would be overestimated when 
the smaller vessel is more expensive than the bigger one. 
 
 
Figure 3. Daily capital cost of container ships. 





Figure 3 shows the daily capital cost (operating days) of 3 container ships, from which we 
can tell that daily capital cost will be decreasing throughout the loan period because of the 
continuous repayments of principal and interest, and container ships with bigger size tend 
to incur higher capital cost than smaller ships, which is caused by the high newbuilding 
price of the mega ships in current market situation. The daily capital cost of 23,000 TEU 
ship is roughly 12% higher than that of the 20,000 TEU ship, and 33% higher than that of 
14,000 TEU ship. 
 
 
Figure 4. Daily capital cost per TEU of container ships. 
Note: Own elaborations based on industry data and estimates. 
 
However, if we look at it from the per-TEU perspective, the result can be quite the 
opposite. Figure 4 shows that, though the numbers are also declining over the loan period, 
the 23,000 TEU ship enjoys the lowest daily capital cost per TEU, 3% lower than that of 
20,000 TEU ship and 19% lower than that of 14,000 TEU ship. This result demonstrates 







Basic Parameters for Operating Cost Analysis of Container Ships 
Vessel Capacity 14,000 TEU 20,000 TEU 23,000 TEU 
Annual OPEX $4,088,000 $4,882,500 $ 5,449,500 
Annual OPEX per 
TEU 
$ 292 $ 244 $ 237 
Daily OPEX $ 11,680 $ 13,950 $ 15,570 
Annual Increase of 
OPEX 
2% 2% 2% 
Operating Days 350 350 350 
Note: Own elaborations based on industry data and estimates. 
 
As Table 2 demonstrated, the annual vessel operating cost (estimated to be 3.5% of the 
newbuilding price) is going to rise because the aging of the vessel, and we estimated the 
increase would be around 2% per annum. The daily operating cost is calculated based on 
350 days (operating days). Though 23,000 TEU ship is leading in annual operating cost, in 
terms of annual operating unit cost, it is the lowest. 
 
 
Figure 5. Daily operating cost per TEU of container ships. 
Note: Own elaborations based on industry data and estimates. 
 
Same case for daily unit operating cost, as is shown in Figure 5, 23,000 TEU ship is 3% 




the economies of scale in vessel’s operating cost. 
 
Table 4 
Basic Parameters for Voyage Cost Analysis of Container Ships 
Vessel Capacity 14,000 TEU 20,000 TEU 23,000 TEU 
Operating Days 350 350 350 
Service Speed 13 knots 13 knots 13 knots 
Daily Fuel Oil 
Consumption 
81 ton 106 ton 118 ton 
Fuel Oil Price per Ton $ 525 $ 525 $ 525 
Total Fuel Cost per day $ 54,351 $ 55,650 $ 61,950 
Voyage Distance 26,919 nm 26,919 nm 26,919 nm 
Sea Voyage Time 86 days 86 days 86 days 
Number of Port of Call 13 13 13 
Port Time 19 days 19 days 19 days 
Total Voyage Time 105 days 105 days 105 days 
Pot Due $ 1,621,807 $ 1,943,151 $ 2,377,687 
West bound cargo (90% 
utility) 
12,667 TEU 18,107 TEU 20,700 TEU 
East bound cargo (50% 
utility) 
7037 TEU 10,060 TEU 11,500 TEU 
Container Handling Cost $ 16,923,985 $ 24,193,098 $27,657,500 
Note: Own elaborations based on industry data and estimates. 
 
As Table 3 shows, we assume that all 3 vessels will be operating at 13 knots, for 350 days 
per year. Bunker prices were quoted on April 7th, 2020 when the price was dropping 
drastically because of the oil price war between Russia and Saudi Arabia after failing to 
reach a deal.  
 
Every vessel on the route of AEU3 will sail about 26,919 nautical miles, calling at 13 ports 
per voyage which lasts for about 85 days. Port due includes the tonnage Due, pilotage due 
(in & out), tugs (in & out), berthage, quarantine charge, convoy fee and agency fee. Vessel 
utility for westbound trade and eastbound trade is differently adjusted according to the 
imbalance of containerized trade. we can learn from table 3 that, vessel size is positively 






Voyage Cost Comparison between different ship sizes 
Vessel Capacity 14,000 TEU 20,000 TEU 23,000 TEU 
Daily Voyage Cost $218,684 $303,907 $347,242 
Daily Unit Voyage Cost $15.62 $15.20 $15.10 
Note: Own elaborations based on industry data and estimates. 
 
The daily voyage cost shown in Table 5 is calculated based on operating days (350 days). 
Though 23,000 TEU ship has the highest daily voyage cost, it achieves lowest cost on a 




Figure 6. Daily total cost per TEU of container ships. 
Note: Own elaborations based on industry data and estimates. 
 
According to Figure 6, 23,000 TEU ship enjoys the lowest daily total unit cost which is 1% 
lower than that of 20,000 TEU ship and 8% lower than that of 14,000 TEU ship. This 
result demonstrates that there is still economy of scale for vessel with capacity bigger than 
20,000 TEU, though the cost reduction is quite small. It also justifies COSCO shipping’s 




such as AEU3.  
 
However, the principle of diminishing marginal returns dictates that there is a limit of scale 
economies, that at some point this reduction in marginal cost may be so small that it is 
negligible (Murray, 2016). And we can tell that 23,000 TEU ship achieves only 1% cost 
reduction comparing with 20,000 TEU ship. There is no guarantee that container ship with 
bigger capacity than 23,000 TEU could still achieve cost reduction under the current 
technical and market conditions. 
 
Many factors could influence the profitability of containerships, consequently it is more 
reasonable to set up different scenarios to better reflect the economic viability of the 













Chapter.5 Global Sulfur Cap and its Implications on Mega Ships 
5.1 The Introduction of Sulfur Cap 
As the most important mode of transportation in international trade, Maritime transport 
causes serious air pollution. Consequently, the international maritime organization (IMO) 
has issued relevant policies to reduce the exhaust emissions from ships. 
 
Annex VI of the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships 
(MARPOL), first adopted in 1997, aims to limit harmful air pollutants in ship exhaust - 
including sulfur oxides and nitrogen oxides - and to ban the deliberate discharge of ozone-
depleting substances (ODS). It also regulates the burning and emission of volatile organic 
compounds (VOC) from ships. In mid-2005, annex VI of the MARPOL convention came 
into force. 
 
At its 53rd session, the commission for Marine Environmental Protection (MEPC) decided 
to amend the convention's shortcomings in order to further limit the ship emission because 
of technological advances and accumulated regulatory experience. Thus, at its 58th 
session, the MEPC adopted the amendment of the annex VI of the MARPOL convention. 
The main changes in the amendments are more limits on global emissions of sulfur oxides 
and nitrogen oxides and the introduction of emission control zones (ECAs), which would 
significantly reduce emissions of air pollutants in selected sea areas.  
 
According to the amendment, all ships sailing outside the emission control zone will 
reduce the sulfur content of their fuel oil from 4.5 % to 3.5 % from the beginning of 2012 
and must use Marine fuel oil with a sulfur content of no more than 0.50 % from 2020. The 
standard for sulfur content of the fuel oil in the emission control zone, which took effect in 




Canada, the US Caribbean and Hawaii. At the MEPC's 70th and 71st meetings (in October 
2016 and July 2017, respectively), all parties confirmed that the implementation of 0.50% 
limit would not be delayed, which means it would take effect as scheduled. 
 
5.2 The Countermeasure Available for Liners 
The first countermeasure for liner companies is switching to compliant fuel or very low 
sulfur fuel oil (VLSFO) with only 0.5% of sulfur content, which is perhaps the simplest 
measure of all and was chosen by majority of shipping lines.  
 
One serious problem with the VLSFO solution is that there are many ways to produce it, 
which means there are many types of VLSFO. It brought a lot of trouble to shipping 
companies, different types of VLSFO are incompatible with each other, sediments created 
as the result of incompatibility may cause damage to vessel’s main engine. Thus, if a 
container ship first refuels in the port of Rotterdam and then in Singapore, the fuel it 
received at both ports must be of the same type, otherwise compatibility problem will 
arise.  
 
Another problem is the availability of VLSFO. Many in the industry have voiced their 
concern about insufficient market supply of compliant fuel, which lead to the creation of 
the fuel oil non-availability report (FONAR), allowing shipowners to avoid being 
penalized by the port authorities unless they cannot prove that their vessel could not obtain 
compliant fuel despite best efforts. The third major problem is the price of VLSFO, which 
is normally higher than high sulfur fuel oil. Shipping lines have to bear this additional cost, 
or they could transfer part of the cost to shipper though fuel surcharge. 
 




other harmful chemicals from vessel’s emission, allowing vessel to continue using high 
sulfur fuel oil which is cheaper than VLSFO. However, the installation of scrubber would 
take months, during which the vessel could not be operational and make profit. There are 
three types of scrubber, close-loop scrubber, open-loop scrubber and hybrid-loop scrubber. 
Vessel installed with open-loop scrubber would discharge waste water with sulfur content 
into the sea, while the close-loop scrubber would store the waste water on the ship until it 
could discharge environmentally friendly. The hybrid-loop scrubber is basically the 
combination of both, allowing the vessel to switch to open-loop mode or close-loop mode.  
 
Since the open-loop solution is polluting the ocean instead of the air, many countries have 
banned the usage of open-loop scrubber in their territorial waters, such as Singapore, 
Malaysia, India, Panama and Norway, etc. Therefore, scrubber solution has some 
regulatory risks, because it is unknown whether IMO will implement stricter 
environmental regulation which possibly would put more restrictions on vessel installed 
with scrubber. Since scrubber allows vessel to continue burning high sulfur fuel oil, one 
should also consider the narrowing price gap between high sulfur fuel oil and VLSFO as 
well as the possibility of insufficient supply of high sulfur fuel oil when the industry 
gradually switches to the production of compliant fuel. 
 
The third countermeasure is switching to LNG which is widely regarded as the cleanest 
fossil fuel in the world. It not only solves the problem caused by this emission reduction 
regulation, but also cope with the possible further stringent regulation in the future. Using 
LNG as fuel for ships can reduce emissions of nitrogen oxides and sulfur oxides by 90 %to 
95 % compared with using high sulfur fuel oil. As a unique fuel, LNG has many 
characteristics, it is odorless, colorless, non-corrosive and non-toxic.  
 
The first problem shipping companies face when using LNG fuel is that its supporting 




LNG storage tanks and other supporting facilities. Therefore, LNG fuel is often used in 
new shipbuilding. According to DNV GL, the capital expenditure for these facilities is 
between $3 million and $30 million.  
 
The second problem is the limited number of LNG refueling facilities. Currently, LNG 
refueling facilities are concentrated in northern Europe, Western Europe, the US gulf coast 
and the US east coast, thus the unbalanced distribution of refueling facilities is a huge 
obstacle to the application of LNG fuel.  
 
The third problem is that the installation of LNG supporting facilities will reduce the 
capacity of ships for carrying cargo. The density of LNG is less than half that of the ship's 
heavy oil, the capacity of the LNG bunker is much larger than that of the fuel tank, and the 
LNG engine and storage tank will take up part of the hull space, which will reduce the 
space for the ship to carry the cargo. 
 
5.3 The Cost of Complying with Sulfur Cap 
Firstly, we need to consider the cost of buying compliant fuel, the VLSFO, since IMO no 
longer allows vessel to use high sulfur fuel oil (HSFO) unless equipped with scrubber. We 
can see from Figure 7 that there is a price gap between these two kinds of fuel oil, which 
averaged at $175 per ton from November 22nd, 2019 to April 17th, 2020. The price gap 
reached its peak on January 3rd, 2020, since last November, which is at $302 per ton. It 
dropped to a record low on April 17th ,2020, at merely $52 per ton. This can be largely 
contributed to the coronavirus pandemic which forces governments across the globe to put 
cities under lockdown in order to contain the spread. Lockdown leads to decline of 
economic activities and subsequently lower demand for manufacturing products as well as 






Figure 7. Price of VLSFO and HSFO per ton. From Clarkson database. 
 
As for the cost for scrubber solution, the total cost can be divided into installation cost, 
HSFO cost and maintenance cost. Qian Qiang and Liu Jia (2016) estimated that the annual 
maintenance cost of scrubber is roughly 1% of its installation cost, it could be formulated 
as follows, 
 
MC = 1% × IC        （5-1） 
 
Where,  
MC - Scrubber Annual Maintenance Cost 





Since the difference between the consumption of HSFO and VLSFO is quite small, we 
assume that the vessel’s HSFO consumption equals to that of VLSFO. Scrubber operations 
tend to cause malfunctions, so we assume that 10 days will be deducted from operating 
days for additional repairs. Zhang (2019) established the formula for the scrubber 
installation cost under the assumption that “the total power of a ship is proportional to the 
price of the scrubber system, and the main engines run on 70% load at maximum, the 
auxiliary engines runs on 85% load at maximum” (p.52). The formula is given as follows, 
 
IC = (0.0565 × (PM ×70% + PA ×85%) + 1.615) × 106        （5-2） 
 
Where, 
IC - Scrubber Installation Cost 
PM - The Main Engines Powers of the Ship (Mw) 
PA - The Auxiliary Engines Powers of the Ship (Mw) 
 
Table 6 shows the scrubber installation cost of container ships, 23,000 TEU ship incurs the 
highest installation cost, 7% higher than that of 14,000 TEU ship and 25% higher than that 
of 20,000 TEU. In terms of installation cost per TEU, 14,000 TEU has the highest figure, 
followed by 23,000 TEU. It should be noted that the 20,000 TEU enjoys the lowest figure 
in both total cost and unit cost for scrubber installation, thus we can clearly tell from Table 
6 that, the economies of scale in this case do not extend to the vessel exceeding the 





Table 6  
Scrubber Installation Cost Comparison between different ship sizes 
Vessel Capacity 14,000 TEU 20,000 TEU 23,000 TEU 
Marin Engine  72.24 Mw 55 Mw 76 Mw 
Auxiliary Engine 10 Mw 8 Mw 14 Mw 
Installation Cost $ 4,928,330 $ 4,188,329 $ 5,252,131 
Installation Cost per 
TEU 
$ 352.02 $ 209.42 $ 228.35 
Note: Own elaborations based on data from Clarkson Research. 
 
We divide the cost for LNG solution into engine installation cost and fuel cost, for LNG 
would become unusable without LNG power engine. We can see from Figure 7 that the 
price of LNG changed dramatically, which averaged at $ 10.36 from the period from April 
of 2007 to March of 2020. LNG price rose to a peak before the collapse of 2008, after the 
financial crisis, it rose to another peak and kept fluctuating until 2014 when the market 
experienced a huge drop. It resumed fluctuation from 2016 to 2018, after which the price 
decreased significantly until a small rise in mid-2019. Then, the coronavirus hit major 
economies in the world, and the oil price witnessed a huge drop, stimulating the 
consumption of fuel oil rather than LNG fuel or other clean fuel. Consequently, the price 
of LNG has been declining since December 0f 2019. We would quote the latest available 
price for our analysis. 
 
 





According to industry estimates, 48.2 mbtu of LNG equals to 1 ton of LNG and we assume 
the consumption of VLSFO equals to that of LNG. Therefore, the daily LNG fuel 
consumption can be formulated as follows, 
 
LC = (-150.946 + 0.004097  CA + 13.44745  S)  48.2        （5-3） 
 
Where, 
LC - Daily LNG Consumption 
CA - Vessel Capacity 
S - Vessel Speed 
 
And for LNG powered container ships, the daily fuel cost can be formulated as follows, 
 
FC = LC  LP         （5-4） 
 
Where, 




LC - Daily LNG Consumption 
LP – LNG Price 
 
Zhang (2019) estimated that the construction cost of LNG power ship is roughly 30% 
higher than that of average ship. Thus, the LNG power engine installation cost can be 
formulated as follows, 
 
LI = 30%  VV        （5-5） 
 
Where, 
LI - LNG Power Engine Installation Cost 
VV - Vessel Value 
 
Table 7  
LNG solution Cost Comparison between different ship sizes 
Vessel Capacity 14,000 TEU 20,000 TEU 23,000 TEU 
Vessel Value   $116,800,000 $139,500,000 $155,700,000 
LNG Engine Installation 
Cost 
$26,280,000 $31,387,500 $35,032,500 
LNG Engine Installation 
Cost per TEU 
$1,877 $1,569 $1,523 
Daily fuel oil 
Consumption  
81 ton 106 ton 118 ton 
Daily LNG Consumption 3904 mbtu 5109 mbtu 5688 mbtu 
LNG Price $2.9 $2.9 $2.9 
Daily LNG Fuel Cost $11,322 $14,817 $16,494 





As shown in Table 7, LNG engine installation cost and LNG fuel cost are positively 
related to the size of the vessel, which means the bigger ship would incur higher 
installation cost and LNG fuel cost. However, 23,000 TEU ship has the lowest installation 
cost in per-TEU basis, which is 3% lower than that of 20,000 TEU ship and 23% lower 
than that of 14,000 TEU ship. After converting ton to mbtu, we can tell that those vessel’s 
daily LNG fuel cost is lower than that of VLSFO. 
 
5.4 The Economic Implication of Sulfur Cap on Mega Ships 
After looking into the cost for each solution, we shall incorporate these analyses into the 
calculation model for container ship cost. The analysis in chapter 4 is actually based on 
compliant fuel solution, so we shall calculate the vessel’s cost based on the other two 
solutions and compare the results, from which we can derive the conclusions and 
suggestions. 
 
Table 8  
Three Scenarios of fuel prices 
Scenario VLSFO Price per 
ton 
HSFO Price per 
ton 
LNG Price per 
mbtu 
1 (High Price Gap)  $671 $369 $4.63 
2 (Low Price Gap) $247 $196 $2 
3 (Medium Price 
Gap) 
$525 $347 $2.9 
Note: Own elaborations based on data from Clarkson Research. 
 
As shown in Table 8, three scenarios will be established to better analysis the economic 
implication of sulfur cap, which are based on fuel prices. Scenario 1 reflects a situation 
when the price gap between VLSFO and HSFO is high ($301). Scenario 2 reflects the 
situation when the price gap is low ($51) and scenario 3 shows medium price gap ($178). 




cap, which lead to overdemand of VLSFO as refineries struggled to increase capacity and 
change production. Scenario 2 happened in April of 2020, as the coronavirus continued to 
severely hit the global economy, reducing demand and subsequently the price for fuel oil. 
Scenario 3 happened in February of 2020, when the coronavirus just began to affect the 




Figure 9. Daily total cost per TEU of different solutions under different scenarios for 14,000 TEU ship. 
Note: Own elaborations based on industry data and estimates. 
 
As figure 9 shows, scrubber has cost advantage under scenario 1 and 2, which means it is 
economical to install scrubbers on 14,000 TEU ships when there is a substantial price gap 
between VLSFO and HSFO. VLSFO becomes more economical when the price gap is 
small and LNG solution is too expensive for 14,000 TEU ships. Under scenario 2, VLSFO 






Figure 10. Daily total cost per TEU of different solutions under different scenarios for 20,000 TEU ship. 
Note: Own elaborations based on industry data and estimates. 
 
As it is demonstrated in Figure 10, scrubber enjoys lower cost advantage comparing with 
other solutions under scenario 1 and 2, same case for 14,000 TEU container ships. VLSFO 
is more economical when the price gap is small, but the cost advantage is quite small 
comparing with scrubber. Under scenario 2, VLSFO achieves the lowest unit cost of all 
solutions under all 3 scenarios. 
 
 
Figure 11. Daily total cost per TEU of different solutions under different scenarios for 23,000 TEU ship. 





Figure 11 shows that LNG is more economic in scenario 1 and scrubber should be chosen 
in scenario 2. Same with 14,000 TEU ship and 20,000 TEU ship, VLSFO is not only 
cheaper than scrubber and LNG in scenario 2, but also cheaper than other solutions of all 3 
scenarios. 
 
After incorporating the cost for complying with sulfur cap, the result we obtained in 
chapter 4 is still valid: 23,000 TEU ship incurs less daily unit cost, comparing with 20,000 
TEU ship and 14,000 TEU ship. For instance, under scenario 1, for VLSFO solution: the 
daily unit cost of 14,000 TEU ship is $23; the daily unit cost of 20,000TEU ship is $21.41; 
the daily unit cost of 23,000 TEU ship is $21.19. 
 
Table 9  
Solution Selection under Three Scenarios 
Scenario 14,000 TEU 20,000 TEU 23,000TEU 
1 (High Price Gap)  Scrubber Scrubber LNG 
2 (Low Price Gap) VLSFO VLSFO VLSFO 
3 (Medium Price 
Gap) 
Scrubber Scrubber Scrubber 
Note: Own elaborations based on data from Clarkson Research. 
 
According to Table 9, scrubber is more often selected under all scenarios for all 3 ship 
types, showing great potential saving for this solution to comply with sulfur cap. LNG is 
only more economical for 23,000 TEU under scenario 1 when price gap is high, meaning 
LNG solution is only suitable for mega ships during times of high fuel oil price. VLSFO 
solution is only chosen when the price gap is small, because the cost saving achieved by 





Chapter 6 Conclusion and Recommendations 
6.1 Conclusion 
Different from many previous studies, this paper found that there is still economy of scale 
to be exploited for container ships beyond the size of 20,000 TEU, justifying major 
shipping line’ s decision to build 23,000 TEU ships and deploy those ships on Europe-Asia 
trade routes. This result is still solid after we incorporate the cost for complying with sulfur 
cap. However, the delivery of these mega ships should be postponed in light of the current 
situation. As for the countermeasures for sulfur cap, scrubber is more economical when the 
price gap between VLSFO and HSFO is high, switching to VLSFO is less costly when the 
price gap is low, LNG solution is only suitable for 23,000 TEU ships when the fuel oil 
price is high. However, this research is based on many assumptions and estimates, which 
should be analyzed deeper and more accurately. 
 
6.2 Recommendations 
The recommendations of this paper shall be based on latest event, the coronavirus, which 
greatly changed the bigger picture. Since the outbreak of this global pandemic, the 
shipping market has witnessed a continuous drop in fuel oil price and maritime transport 
demand, because of the shut-down of economies across the globe to contain the spread of 
the virus. Some experts warned that the virus will not be gone until summer and it may 
come back in winter. According to the estimates of Clarkson Research, the world 
economic growth in 2020 will be reduced by 3% and seaborne trade growth will be around 
2% or even -0.3%, way lower than the estimates made before the virus. Under this 
circumstance, shipping lines profit will be significantly reduced which has been shown by 
their quarter report. 
 
Therefore, scenario 2 is more likely to come true which means the price gap between 




Considering the shipping line’s profitability will be reduced, it is harder for them to spend 
extra money on installing scrubbers or LNG engines, because the top priority for now is to 
survive through this difficult time. This has been partly demonstrated by data of Clarkson 
Research, which shows a decline of number of vessels waiting to be installed with 
scrubbers, some contracts were even canceled. Besides, the regulatory risk of the scrubber 
solution cannot be underestimated, since many countries and regions have banned the open 
loop scrubber, closed loop or hybrid scrubber may possibly be deemed un-environmentally 
friendly in the future when IMO decides to implement stricter regulation. Thus, we 



















Bergmann, J. (2014, April 8). Future development of ultra large container ships. [PowerPoint slides]. 
Retrieved from https://www.innovasjonnorge.no/globalassets/arrangementer/9-jost-
bergmann.pdf 
Chen, F., & Zhang, R. (2008). Economic viability of mega-size containership in different service 
network. Journal of Shanghai Jiaotong University (Science), 13(2), 221-225. 
doi:10.1007/s12204-008-0221-6. 
Cullinane, K., & Khanna, M. (2000). Economies of scale in large containerships: optimal size and 
geographical implications. Journal of Transport Geography, 8, 181-195. 
Guan C., Yahalom, S., & Yu, J. (2017). Port congestion and economies of scale: The large container 
ship factor. Paper presented at the Annual Conference of the International Association of 
Maritime Economists. Conference. 27–30 June. Kyoto, Japan. 
Guo, Y. (2000). The economic analysis of the enlargement of container ship [Master’s thesis, Dalian 
Maritime University]. 
Helmy, S., & Shrabia, A. (2016). Mega container ships, pros, cons and its implication recession. 
Journal of Shipping and Ocean Engineering, 6, 284-290. doi:10.17265/2159-5879/2016.05.004. 
Imai, A., Nishimura, E., Papadimitriou, S., & Liu, M. (2006). The economic viability of container 
mega-ships. Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, 42 (1), 21-
41. doi:10.1016/j.tre.2004.07.002. 
International Transport Forum, OECD. (2015). The impact of mega ships. Retrieved from 
https://www.itf-oecd.org/sites/default/files/docs/15cspa_mega-ships.pdf 
Jong, S. (2017). The study on Impacts of mega container ships on ports. Pan-Pacific Journal of 
Supply Chain Management: Applications and Practices, 1, 22-40. 




Li, J. (2005). Study on economies of scale of container liner transport industry [Master’s thesis, 
Shanghai Maritime University]. 




Merk, O. (2018), Container ship size and port relocation, Discussion Paper, International Transport 
Forum. 
Murray, W. (2016). Economies of Scale in Container Ship Costs. United States Merchant Marine 
Academy 
Park, N., & Suh, C. (2019). Tendency toward Mega Containerships and the Constraints of Container 
Terminals. Journal of Marine Science and Engineering, 7, 131-144. 




Naval Architecture and Ocean Engineering, 32 (4), 23-26.  
Rodrigue, J. (2020). The Geography of Transport System. New York: Routledge. 
Stopford, M. (2002). Is the drive for ever bigger containerships irresistible. Proceedings of the 
Lloyds List Shipping Forecasting Conference, 26 April.  
UNCTAD. (2019). The Review of Maritime Transport 2019. Retrieved from 
https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/rmt2019_en.pdf  
Veldman, S., Glansdorp, C., & Kok, R. (2011). Economies of size of large containerships based on 
internal and external costs. Int. J. of Decision Sciences, 3, 384 - 400. 
doi:10.1504/IJDSRM.2011.046160. 
Wang, X. (2006). Study on the operational economics of large containership under the hub-port 
condition [Doctor’s thesis, Shanghai Jiao Tong University]. 
Weng, Y. (2018). The technological economics and sensitivity analysis of mega containerships. 
China Ship Survey, (10), 86-91. 
Wu, H. (2012). Discussion on economic efficiency and safety of ever-larger container ships. 
Navigation of China, 35(02), 114-118. 
Xiang, J., Zhu, X., & Jin, Y. (2014). Analysis of promotion and restriction factors in the process of 
ship size growth. Journal of Shanghai Ship and Shipping Research Institute, 37(1), 19-24. 
Yan, J. (2012). Study on large container vessel’s economics viability and countermeasure research 
based on the economic recession [Master’s thesis, Shanghai Jiao Tong University]. 
Zhang, T. (2019). Comparative analysis of SOx emission control technologies for container ships 
[Master’s thesis, World Maritime University]. https://commons.wmu.se/all_dissertations/ 
